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JURISDICTION OF THE COURT
Jurisdiction is conferred upon this Court by virtue of § 78-2a-3(e), U.C.A.

ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW,
STANDARD OF REVIEW, AND
PRESERVATION OF ISSUE
1. Issue: Whether the trial court erred in denying the Defendant/Appellant court
appointed counsel or an opportunity to retain counsel when the Defendant/Appellant
expressly and repeatedly requested an attorney and where the trial court failed to make
any inquiry into the Defendant's/Appellant's indigence, competence, or his desire to
represent himself.
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Standard of Review. The Defendant/Appellant believes this issue is a question of
law and is therefore reviewed for correctness. See State v. McDonald, 922 P.2d 776, 781,
295 Utah Adv. Rep. 9, 11 (Utah App. 1996); State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 935-40
(Utah 1994) (issue of waiver of constitutional rights is reviewed for correctness).
Preservation of Issue: This issue was raised in the form of a Motion to Arrest
Judgment two days following the Defendant's/Appellant's conviction at a bench trial, and
the Defendant/Appellant timely filed on July 22, 1996, his Notice of Appeal. (R. 18, 75.)

2. Issue: Whether the trial court erred in denying the Defendant/Appellant a
continuance on the day of trial so that he could retain counsel where such denial
implicates the Defendant's/Appellant's fundamental right to counsel.
Standard of Review. This issue is a matter of discretion and is reviewed under an
abuse of discretion standard, i.e., no reasonable basis for the decision. See State v.
Cabututan, 861 P.2d 408, 413 (Utah 1993). However, when a continuance is sought to
retain or replace counsel, greater scrutiny is required. See U.S.A. v. Burton,
584 F.2d 485, 489 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
Preservation of Issue: This issue was raised in the form of a motion for a new trial
two days following the Defendant's/Appellant's conviction at a bench trial, and the
Defendant/Appellant timely filed on July 22, 1996, his Notice of Appeal. (R. 18, 75.)

-6-

3. Issue: Whether the trial court erred in denying the Defendant's/Appellant's
motion for new trial where the trial court had forced the Defendant/Appellant to represent
himself at trial and where the trial court had failed to make any inquiry into the
Defendant's/Appellant's competence or his desire to represent himself.
Standard of Review: This issue is a matter of discretion and is reviewed under an
abuse of discretion standard, except where the court's ruling is based upon a conclusion
of law, and then it is reviewed for correctness. See Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch.
860 P.2d 937, 938 (Utah 1993); Horrell v. Utah Farm Bureau Ins. Co., 909 P.2d 1279,
1280 (Utah App. 1996). In this case, the trial court denied a new trial because (1) the
Defendant/Appellant had no right to counsel, or (2) the Defendant/Appellant untimely
requested counsel. The trial court's reasons are believed to be incorrect conclusions of
law, and therefore, the standard of review in the instant case should be reviewed for
correctness.
Preservation of Issue: This issue was raised in the form of a Motion to Arrest
Judgment two days following the Defendant's/Appellant's conviction at a bench trial, and
the Defendant/Appellant timely filed on July 22, 1996, his Notice of Appeal. (R. 18, 75.)
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STATUTORY PROVISIONS
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION, SIXTH AMENDMENT:

In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy
and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime
shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously
ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the
Assistance of counsel for his defence, (emphases added).

UTAH CONSTITUTION, ARTICLE

I, SECTION 12 (in part).

In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and
defend in person and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the
accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to
be confronted by the witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to
compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy public
trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in which the offense is
alleged to have been committed, and the right to appeal in all cases. In no
instance shall any accused person, before final judgment, be compelled to
advance money or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed. The accused
shall not be compelled to give evidence against himself; a wife shall not be
compelled to testify against her husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor
shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense, (emphasis
added).

UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-l-6(l)(a), 6(l)(f), (6)(2)(d) (1995):
(1) In criminal prosecutions the defendant is entitled:
(a) To appear in person and defend in person or by counsel:
(f) To a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county or district where
the offense is alleged to have been committed;
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(2) In addition:
(d) A wife shall not be compelled to testify against her husband nor a husband
against his wife;. . .
(emphasis added).
UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 77-32-1, et seq.(pertinent part):

Each county, city, and town shall provide for the defense of indigent persons in
criminal cases in the courts and various administrative bodies of the state in
accordance with the following minimum standards:
(1) provide counsel for every indigent person who faces the substantial

probability of the deprivation of the indigent defendant's liberty;
(emphasis added).
UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 76-5-102 (pertinent part):

(1) Assault is:
(a) an attempt, with unlawful force or violence, to do bodily injury to another;
(b) a threat, accompanied by a show of immediate force or violence, to do
bodily injury to another; or
(c) an act, committed with unlawful force or violence, that causes or creates a
substantial risk of bodily injury to another.
(2) Assault is a class B misdemeanor.
(3) Assault is a class A misdemeanor if the person causes substantial bodily injury
to another.
(emphasis added).
UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 76-3-204 (pertinent part):

A person who has been convicted of a misdemeanor may be sentenced to
imprisonment as follows:
(1) In the case of a class A misdemeanor, for a term not exceeding one year;
(2) In the case of a class B misdemeanor, for a term not exceeding six months:
(3) In the case of a class C misdemeanor, for a term not exceeding ninety days,
(emphasis added).
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UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 76-3-301 (pertinent part):

(1) A person convicted of an offense may be sentenced to pay a fine, not
exceeding:
(a) $10,000 for a felony conviction of the first degree or second degree;
(b) $5,000 for a felony conviction of the third degree;
(c) $2,500 for a class A misdemeanor conviction;
(d) $l r 000 for a class B misdemeanor conviction:
(e) $750 for a class C misdemeanor conviction or infraction conviction; and
(f) any greater amounts specifically authorized by statute,
(emphasis added).
UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, RULE

17 (pertinent part).

(a) In all cases the defendant shall have the right to appear and defend in
person and by counsel
(c) All felony cases shall be tried by jury unless the defendant waives a jury in
open court with the approval of the court and the consent of the prosecution.
(d) All other cases shall be tried without a jury unless the defendant makes
written demand at least ten days prior to trial, or the court orders otherwise. No
jury shall be allowed in the trial of an infraction.
(emphasis added).

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
1. The Plaintiff/Appellee, Layton City ("City"), a political subdivision of the State
of Utah, initiated this action on July 21, 1995, pursuant to § 76-5-102, U.C.A., against the
Defendant/Appellant, Daniel Longcrier ("Daniel"), by issuing a summons for "Simple
Assault." (R. 1, 8.) Daniel was charged by Information with assaulting his female friend,
and the mother of their child, on June 16, 1995. (R. 5.) The police officer's report
indicates that he "observed no physical signs or injury" on the girlfriend.1 (Police Report
The Plaintiff/Appellee filed its "Response to Defendant's Request for Discovery" on
February 28, 1996 (R 24 ) Although the Response clearly states that a copy of the police report is attached, such
report is missing from the Recoid For completeness and for reference, Daniel has attached hereto a copy of the police
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at 4, attached hereto as Addendum 1.) Two months subsequent to the alleged assault,
Daniel and his alleged victim were married.
2. Daniel, a nineteen year old young man who completed only the tenth grade,
resides in Bountiful, Utah. (R. 92; Hr'g Tr. at 7, lines 20-21, attached hereto as
Addendum 2.) Daniel has no record of any other criminal or traffic violations. (R. 37.)
3. On October 11, 1995, Daniel appeared without counsel at a pre-trial conference.
(R. 1.) The following week the trial court scheduled the trial on February 21, 1996. (Id.)
4. Upon departing the pre-trial conference, Daniel asked the City's Prosecutor if he
could have an attorney. (R. 93, 95; Hr'g Tr. at 8, lines 3-4, at 10, lines 21-25,
Addendum 2.) The Prosecutor indicated to Daniel that any appointment of counsel was
up to the judge of the trial court. (Id.)
5. Sometime prior to the trial date, Daniel telephoned the trial court and asked
whether he could have an attorney. (R. 93; Hr'g Tr. at 8, lines 7-9, Addendum 2.) He
was told by a clerk that when he arrived at the court he should ask the judge for an
attorney. (Id.)
6. On February, 21, 1996, the day of trial, Daniel asked Judge Bean for an attorney.
(R. 68; R. 85, Trial Tr. at 3, lines 13-15, attached hereto as Addendum 3.) Without any
inquiry of Daniel's indigence, competence, or desire to represent himself, Judge Bean
denied Daniel's request for an attorney, denied a continuance for Daniel to retain counsel,

report referenced in the Plaintiffs/Appellee^ Response as Addendum 1
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and immediately forced Daniel to proceed to trial. (Id. at lines 13-17.)
7. During the trial, Daniel was not represented by counsel; he presented no defense
whatsoever. (R. 1.)
8. Since Daniel was without counsel through all proceedings prior to and during the
trial, Daniel failed to request a jury trial as required by Rule 17(d), Utah R. Civ. P.
9. During the trial, the Prosecutor called Daniel's wife as a witness to testify against
him in direct violation of Daniel's rights to not have his wife testify against him. (R. 1.)
When her testimony was not helpful to the Prosecution's case, the Prosecutor entered into
evidence, against the objections of Daniel, his wife's prior written statement. (R. 12, 15.)
10. Daniel, without any legal representation, was found guilty of a Class B
Misdemeanor at a bench trial held on February 21, 1996. (Id)
11. Upon conviction, but prior to sentencing, Daniel then sought help for the first
time from his present counsel. (R. 93-94; Hr'g Tr. at 8-9, lines 25-8, Addendum 2.)
12. Immediately after being found guilty, the City's Prosecutor recommended "jail
time" to the trial court. (R. 1.) However, after Daniel retained counsel the following day
and said counsel filed a Motion for a new trial, the City's Prosecutor offered to withdraw
his recommendation for jail time in an effort to plea bargain Daniel's case. (City's Letter,
dated March 26, 1996, attached hereto as Addendum 4.)
13. At the sentencing hearing on February 23, 1996, Daniel was represented by his
present counsel who filed a written motion to the trial court for Arrest of Judgment or a
New Trial. (R. 2, 16-23.) Instead of proceeding with sentencing, the trial court heard
- 12-

oral argument from the attorneys on Daniel's Motion and then took the matter under
advisement. (R. 2, 67.)
14. The trial court scheduled a second hearing on the issue of what Daniel knew
about his rights to an attorney and when he knew it. (R. 2.) That hearing was held on
April 16, 1996, and the trial court again took the matter under advisement. (R. 2-3, 107.)
15. On July 9, 1996,2 Judge K. Roger Bean entered a written and signed decision
which denied Daniel's request for a new trial. (R. 3, 67.) Judge Bean's decision admits
that he "made no inquiry as to whether [Daniel] qualified for appointed counsel" because
the Court "considered the request untimely." (R. 68; Mem. of Decision at 2, attached
hereto as Addendum 5.) The trial court also relied on a line of cases set forth in the City
Prosecutor's brief and which brief opposed Daniel's motion for a new trial. (R. 69;
Mem. of Decision at 3, Addendum 5.) Finally, the trial court plainly admits that it "did
not have the opportunity to determine whether" Daniel qualified or not for a court
appointed attorney. (Id.)
16. On July 22, 1996, the trial court sentenced Daniel. (R. 73-74.) The trial court
imposed a fine of $800.00 and 90 days in jail, with $200 of the fine and the jail time
suspended upon payment of the fine. (Id.) The trial court also imposed a requirement
that Daniel enroll in an anger management course for eight weeks. (Id.) Daniel filed his
Notice of Appeal the following day, July 23, 1996.

Although Judge Bearfs Memorandum of Decision, (R 67 ), is dated June 14, 1996, it was not filed
and served until July 9, 1996
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The central, underlying issue in Daniel's appeal is whether or not he possessed a
fundamental right to retain counsel to assist him in his defense. This is not to be
confused with whether Daniel had arightto court appointed counsel, which depends on
whether he was indigent and whether he faced the substantial probability of jail time. If
Daniel enjoyed the right to retain counsel to assist him, not court appointed counsel, then
the trial court clearly erred in not permitting him an opportunity to retain counsel, in not
granting a continuance long enough for Daniel to retain such counsel, and in not granting
Daniel's request for a new trial because his fundamental rights were clearly infringed.
The entire line of cases dealing with the issue of an accused's right to counsel are all
predicated on court appointed counsel. The City's Prosecutor filed an opposition
memorandum in response to Daniel's motion for a new trial, and the cases cited therein
all deal with court appointed counsel or court paid transcripts. The trial court incorrectly
relied on those cases, and Daniel believes, that the trial court became confused as to the
central issue in this matter: whether Daniel has a fundamental right, irrespective of
whether incarceration is involved, to retain his own counsel.
If the trial court's theory were to hold, then any court that was prepared to avoid
imposing jail time could then deny any defendant, rich or poor, the right to bring counsel
to represent him or her in any criminal proceeding. Such a position would extend
Argersinger and Scott well beyond their intended boundaries. The implications are
profound and most disturbing; they cannot be correct and cannot stand.
- 14-

The trial court failed to provide even a modicum of fairness to Daniel. The trial
court provided no instructions, printed or otherwise, for accused indigents to follow in
obtaining court appointed counsel. The trial court could easily see that Daniel was
young, inexperienced, and he never presented any defense during his brief thirty minute
trial. Despite these observations, the trial court failed to conduct any colloquy with
Daniel regarding his indigence, competence, or his desire to represent himself. The
burden on the trial court was slight; the burden placed on Daniel, because of the trial
court's failure to act in the interests of justice, was and remains heavy.
ARGUMENT
Although this appeal presents three issues, they are all interrelated. The underlying
question to all three issues is whether or not Daniel possessed the fundamental right to
the assistance of counsel at his trial If he had no right to counsel or if the denial of
counsel was harmless, then Daniel's appeal lacks merit. Appropriately, this underlying
question is paramount to the analysis of the three issues presented and is analyzed first.
I.

Daniel possessed the fundamental right to the assistance of counsel at his trial.
Our Constitutions grant fundamental rights to persons accused of crimes.

Specifically, accused persons are entitled to "have the assistance of counsel" or to
"appear and defend in person and by counsel." U.S. Const., Sixth Am.; Utah Const., Art.
I., Sec. 12. This right is also granted by Utah's laws:
(1) In criminal prosecutions the defendant is entitled:
(a) To appear in person and defend in person or by counsel:
- 15-

§77-l-6(l)(a), U.C.A.
(a) In all cases the defendant shall have the right to appear and defend in
person and by counsel . . .
Rule 17, UtahR. Crim P.
This right has enjoyed immense success over the years.3 The courts have also
extended this right to indigent persons by requiring our various governments to provide
free counsel to indigent persons in criminal cases. See Scott v. Illinois, 99 S. Ct. 1158,
440 U.S. 367, 59 L.Ed.2d 383 (1979); Argersinger v. Hamlin, 92 S. Ct. 2006, 2012, 407
U.S. 31, 37, L.Ed.2d 530 (1972). Notwithstanding this right, the United States Supreme
Court and the Utah Supreme Court have each limited the right to enjoy court appointed
counsel to cases where the accused faces a substantial probability of imprisonment or is
actually sentenced to serve jail time. Id.; see also Salt Lake City v. Grotepas,
906 P.2d 890, 892 (Utah 1995) (while right to court appointed counsel is a fundamental
right, it is not absolute); City of St. George v. Smith, 828 P.2d 504, 506 (Utah App. 1992)
(trial court erred by granting the city's motion to withdraw appointed counsel where there
was a substantial probability of jail time).
In Argersinger, the United States Supreme Court rejected Florida's curtailment of
court appointed counsel to cases where the imprisonment was six months or longer.
Argersinger, 92 S. Ct. at 2009. The Court strongly reaffirmed the need for counsel in

For an excellent discussion of the right to assistance of counsel, see Argersinger v. Hamlin,
92 S. Ct. 2006, 407 U.S. 31, L.Ed.2d 530 (1972).
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criminal cases, including misdemeanors and minor offenses:
The requirement of counsel may well be necessary for a fair
trial even in a petty-offense prosecution. We are by no means
convinced that legal and constitutional questions involved in a case
that actually leads to imprisonment even for a brief period are any
less complex than when a person can be sent off for six months or
more. Id. at 2010.
The Court also expressed its concern that less serious cases may be short-changed in
our very busy courts:
In addition, the volume of misdemeanor cases, far greater in number
than felony prosecutions, may create an obsession for speedy dispositions,
regardless of the fairness of the result. The Report by the President's
Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, The
Challenge of Crime in a Free Society 128 (1967), states:
"For example, until legislation last year increased the number of
judges, the District of Columbia C o u r t . . . . had four judges to
process the preliminary stages of more than 1,500 felony cases,
7,500 serious misdemeanor cases, and 38,000 petty offenses and an
equal number of traffic offenses per year. An inevitable
consequence of volume that large is the almost total preoccupation in
such a court with the movement of cases. The calendar is long,
speed often is substituted for care . . . Inadequate attention tends to
be given to the individual defendant, whether in protecting his rights,
[or] sifting the facts at trial, . . . The frequent result is futility and
failure." M a t 2011.
The Court also cited several studies, including one by the American Civil Liberties
Union, Legal Counsel for Misdemeanants, Preliminary Report 1 (1970):
"One study concluded that "[mjisdemeanants represented by
attorneys are five times as likely to emerge from police court with all
charges dismissed as are defendants who face similar charges without
counsel." Id. at 2012 (emphasis added).
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The limitations imposed by governments and the courts, state and federal, relate
solely to court appointed counsel. There are no known limitations to retained or privately
paid counsel The underlying balancing force against providing free counsel to indigents
with no limitations and in all cases is the social cost:
In Argersinger the Court rejected arguments that social cost or a lack
of available lawyers militated against its holding, in some part because it
thought these arguments were factually incorrect. But they were rejected
in much larger part because of the Court's conclusion that incarceration
was so severe a sanction that it should not be imposed as a result of a
criminal trial unless an indigent defendant had been offered appointed
counsel to assist in his defense, regardless of the cost to the States implicit
in such a rule. Scott, 99 S. Ct. 1158 at 1162-63 (emphasis added).
In essence, the entire line of cases dealing with defining limitations on the right to
counsel, deal exclusively with court appointed counsel It is important and necessary to
this analysis to clearly distinguish between the right to the assistance of counsel and the
right to the assistance of court appointed counsel While Daniel may have been entitled
to court appointed counsel at his trial, the trial court admits, without any apologies, that it
failed to make any inquiry on the issue of whether or not Daniel was indigent. (R. 68, 85;
Trial Tr. at 3, lines 13-15, Addendum 3.) Daniels appeal, however, does not depend on
his indigence.
The core argument presented herein is that Daniel had a right to have counsel assist
him at trial, regardless of whether such counsel was court appointed or whether Daniel
independently retained counsel Notwithstanding Daniels status as an indigent, the
record is clear that Daniel was in fact able to retain his present counsel, even if such
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counsel was retained on a pro bono basis.
Layton City's Prosecutor filed a memorandum in opposition to Daniel's motion for a
new trial. (R. 34-39.) None of the arguments made by the City contend that Daniel had
no right to retain counsel. All of the cases cited by the City are those in which the
limitation on the right to counsel refers to the right to court appointed counsel. See id.
The City misapprehends the concept which the courts have articulated that the right to
counsel is "not absolute." See id. The courts intended that phrase to mean the "right to
court appointed counsel is not absolute."

II.

The trial court erred in denying court appointed counsel for Daniel or denying
him an opportunity to retain counsel because the trial court failed to make any
inquiry into Daniel's indigency competence, or his desire tQ represent himselft

a. If indigent, Daniel was entitled to court appointed counselt
From the foregoing analysis, Daniel clearly had a right to retain counsel to assist
him in his defense at trial. Whether he was entitled to court appointed counsel is yet to
be determined. If, however, he qualified as an indigent, Daniel would have been entitled
to court appointed counsel because he faced the substantial probability of jail time. See
§ 77-32-1, U.C.A. Daniel was charged with a Class B Misdemeanor. (R. 5.) Such
offense carries with it a potential penalty of jail time "not exceeding six months" and a
fine "not exceeding $1,000:' §§ 76-3-204, 76-3-301, U.C.A.
Not having any sentencing statistics for Judge Bean's court nor statistics of
sentences for "simple assaults" in the Second Judicial District, the only information
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available to assess the likelihood of jail time is the City's recommendation for a penalty.
Immediately following Daniel's conviction, the City recommended "jail time due to
aggravated circumstances." (R. 1.) It was only after Daniel's present counsel filed a
motion for a new trial did the City offer to retreat from its "jail time" recommendation.
See City 's Letter, Addendum 4.)
"The City is willing to reduce the charge from assault to one of
disorderly conduct, a class "C" Misdemeanor. Upon Mr.
Longcrier's plea of guilty to that amended charge, the City will
recommend that no jail time be imposed,. . ." (Addendum 4.)
If the Court were generally inclined to follow the City's sentencing
recommendations, Daniel certainly faced "the substantial probability of deprivation of the
indigent defendant's liberty." See § 77-32-1, U.C.A. Ironically, the City's memorandum
in opposition to a new trial focused on the fact that the trial court could not impose jail
time because Daniel had not been represented by counsel at trial. (R. 34-39.) If that was,
or is, the City's understanding of the law, then the City was disingenuous by
recommending jail time for Daniel immediately following Daniel's trial when the City
knew at the time of its recommendation that Daniel had not been represented by counsel.
(R. 1.) If the City truly believed that Daniel should be incarcerated in the interests of
justice, the City should have urged the trial court to either appoint counsel for Daniel or
permit him time to retain counsel of his choice. Following that course would have
permitted the City to adhere to its convictions that Daniel deserved jail time. Instead, the
path followed by the City obviously and admittedly now precludes such an outcome.
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b. Daniel never waived his right to the assistance of counselt
Although the trial court and the City suggested during the hearings on Daniel's
motion for a new trial that Daniel had waived his right to counsel by his actions, it is well
established that a defendant must waive his or her right to counsel "knowingly and
intelligently." See e.g. State v. Frampton, 737 P.2d 183, 187 (Utah 1987)(assistance of
counsel is personal and may be waived by a competent accused if the waiver is
knowingly and intelligently); State v. Hamilton, 732 P.2d 505, 507 (Utah 1986)(record
must show that an accused was offered counsel but intelligently and understanding^
rejected the offer)(citing Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506, 82 S. Ct. 884, 8 L.Ed.2d 70
(1962); State v. Ruple, 631 P.2d 874, 876 (Utah 1981)(record failed to demonstrate that
defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his right to counsel); State v. McDonald,
922 P.2d 776, 786 (Utah App. 1996)(even though trial court failed to make an ideal
inquiry into whether defendant made an intelligent waiver, the trial court correctly
determined defendant knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his right to
counsel).
There is no indication in the record that Daniel ever desired to represent himself.
There is no evidence whatsoever in the record that Daniel waived his right to counsel.
The trial court admits that it "made no inquiry as to whether [Daniel] qualified for
appointed counsel." (R. 68; Mem. of Decision at 2, Addendum 5.) The trial court
appears to draw significance from the fact that there was a space for "Defendant's
Attorney" on the court's Notice of Pretrial and its Notice of Trial, and such designation
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was "five-eighths" or "one-half of an inch within Daniel's signature. {Id. at 1,2.)
Apparently, the trial court attempts to infer that Daniel had waived his right to
counsel and was conveying by his actions that he desired to represent himself.
Notwithstanding such inference, the trial court falls far short of any sort of "colloquy"
with Daniel as suggested in Frampton, 731 P.2d at 187. In fact, the trial court set forth in
its Memorandum of Decision its entire brief colloquy with Daniel. (R. 68; Mem. of
Decision at 2, Addendum 5.):
Court:

Is the City ready to proceed?

Mr. Garside:

We are, your honor.

Court:

Mr. Longcrier, are you ready to proceed?

Mr. Longcrier:

I need an attorney. They said, when I called, that I
could ask for one.

Court:

Just have a seat, sir. The Court denies your request for
a continuance so that you could get a lawyer, and you
may proceed, Mr. Garside.

The foregoing is the entire colloquy between the trial court and Daniel. It is clear
that the trial court made no effort to inquire whether Daniel desired to represent himself.
Further, there is no evidence advanced by the trial court or the City that Daniel ever
expressed any desire or intention to represent himself.
The instant case parallels Ruple, 631 P.2d at 876. In Ruple,
the defendant here at the time of trial had not finished the twelfth grade of
school and suffered from minimal brain disfunction as well as dyslexia.
While the defendant had been in the court before, mostly on juvenile
charges, the record does not reveal that he had ever gone through a trial or
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had even witnessed a trial the likes of which he was about to conduct.
The record does not demonstrate that the defendant "knowingly and
intelligently" made his choice to represent himself. The judgment below
is reversed and the case is remanded for a new trial. Id. at 786.
Daniel failed to advance beyond the tenth grade in school. He has never been in
court prior to this case because he has no prior arrests or violations. (R. 37.) Most
importantly, the trial court failed to establish by any means that Daniel waived his right to
counsel, whether such counsel was to be court appointed or retained by Daniel.
III. The trial court erred in denying Daniel a continuance on the day of trial so that
he could retain counsel because such denial effectively denied Daniel's
fundamental right to counsel,
While the trial court has wide discretion in granting or denying a continuance, when
such continuance implicates a fundamental right such as a defendant's right to counsel,
the trial court's actions should be scrutinized more closely. See State v. Cabututan,
861 P.2d 408, 413 (Utah App. 1993); U.S.A. v. Nichols, 654 F. Supp. 1541 (Utah CD.
1987)(right to counsel to be balanced against the orderly administration of justice); U.S.A.
v. Barton, 584 F.2d 485, 489 (D.C. Cir. 1978)(when continuance implicates Sixth
Amendment right to the assistance of counsel, right to select counsel must be balanced
against the orderly administration of justice). What is a reasonable delay depends on all
the surrounding facts and circumstances. Burton, 584 F.2d at 490. The court in Burton,
articulated several factors to be considered in balancing the defendant's right to counsel
with the orderly administration of justice:
. . . the length of the requested delay; whether other continuances have
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been requested and granted; the balanced convenience or inconvenience
to the litigants, witnesses, counsel, and the court; whether the requested
delay is for legitimate reasons, or whether it is dilatory, purposeful, or
contrived; whether the defendant contributed to the circumstance which
gives rise to the request for a continuance; whether the defendant has
other competent counsel prepared to try the case; whether denying the
continuance will result in identifiable prejudice to defendant's case, and if
so, whether this prejudice is of a material or substantial nature; the
complexity of the case; and other relevant factors which may appear in
the context of any particular case. Id. at 491.
In the instant case, Daniel had not sought any prior continuance. The trial was
simple, lasting only about thirty minutes; the police officer involved was not present for
the trial. The continuance was for the sole purpose of allowing Daniel sufficient time to
obtain counsel. Daniel was not provided any instructions on how to apply for a court
appointed attorney except that he was merely told to "ask the judge." (R. 93, 95; Hr'g Tr.
at 8 lines 7-9, Addendum 2.) The burden on the trial court to grant a continuance was
slight. The minor delay in collecting any monetary fines from Daniel, assuming he were
found guilty, posed very little burden on the State; Daniel's freedom was not an issue
since he could not be incarcerated. On balance, it seems that Daniel's right to retain
counsel far outweighs any burdens such continuance would impose on the trial court and
its orderly administration of justice.
Finally, the record reflects that Daniel's sole source of information concerning a
court appointed attorney came either from the City or one of the trial court's clerks. (R.
93, 95; Hr'g Tr. at 8, lines 3-4, 7-9, Addendum 2.) Daniel was never provided any
written instructions. He relied on what the court's clerk told him. Id. When he arrived at

-24-

the trial court, he asked for an attorney. (R. 68; Mem. of Decision at 2, Addendum 5.)
Unfortunately, the trial court barely gave him the time of day. Id. Daniel asked for an
attorney. Id. The trial court, quickly, abruptly, and with no dialogue with Daniel, denied
his request and immediately proceeded to trial. Id.
Interestingly, the trial court's reliance on State v. Penderville, 272 P.2d 195
(Utah 1954), actually supports Daniel's position. The court in Penderville was reversed
because the court failed to permit the defendant his right to represent himself. Id. at 199.
The defendant, who initially had counsel, requested to represent himself the day before
trial, but he wanted more time to prepare for trial. Id. The trial court was of the opinion
that the application by the defendant was a made in bad faith. Id. However, Utah's
Supreme Court opined in Penderville:
Regardless of what we may conclude to be the motives of the defendant,
he failed in the effort and no delay was occasioned by his having made
the application [for a continuance]. Can it be said that the appellant lost
his right to defend in person by his unsuccessful effort to have his trial
postponed to get other counsel? We think not. The right to defend in
person certainly should no be denied an accused in a situation where he
must either choose to use it or proceed with counsel in whom he has lost
confidence. We hold that the court erred in denying appellant the right to
try his case without the aid of counsel and that because of this error he is
entitled to a new trial. Id.
An accused's constitutional rights to defend (1) in person or (2) with the assistance
of counsel appear as co-equal rights. A person either defends with counsel or by selfrepresentation. The court in Penderville held that a defendant had a fundamental right to
make a last minute change from being represented by counsel to self-representation. Id.
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In the instant case, Daniel desired to be represented by counsel. Even if, arguendo, he
had earlier expressed a desire to represent himself, the trial court had a duty to honor
Daniel's request to be represented by counsel, notwithstanding his request was made at
the beginning of the trial. A short continuance is more efficient than a new trial. It also
promotes greater justice.
IV. The trial court erred in denying Daniel's motion for new trial because the trial
court forced Daniel to represent himself at trial without making any inquiry into
DaniePs competence or his desire to represent himself.
In Utah, a trial court may grant a motion for a new trial "in the interest of justice if
there is any error or impropriety which had a substantial adverse effect upon the rights of
a party." State v. Owens, 753 P.2d 976, 978 (Utah App. 1988). There can be no doubt
that Daniel's rights were substantially and adversely infringed by having no counsel to
represent him at trial. He could have requested a jury trial; without counsel he was
unaware of Rule 17. His wife's testimony and her prior written statement were used
against him. (R. 1, 12, 15.) The police officer was not present to testify that he
"observed no physical signs or injury," nor was his report entered into evidence. (R. 1.,
Police Report at 4, Addendum 1.) Daniel presented no defense. (R. 1.) In essence,
Daniel's lack of counsel at trial was devastating to him.
The trial court appeared to deny Daniel's request for a new trial based on an
incorrect legal conclusion. The trial court relied on the line of cases presented by the
City in its opposition memorandum. (R. 69; Mem. of Decision at 3, Addendum 5.):
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The Prosecutor's argument, set forth in his brief, that the Defendant
has no right to the assistance of counsel unless he is sentenced to
incarceration, is also directly in point. Most of the cases cited there
refer to court appointed counsel. Because of the timing of
Defendant's request for appointed counsel, the court did not have the
opportunity to determine whether he qualified or not. Id.
The trial court's Decision infers that Daniel had no right to retain counsel of his
own. Yet, Daniel clearly has a right to counsel, even though he may not have a right to
court appointed counsel. The trial court never made this distinction. Accordingly, the
trial court's legal conclusion, on which it based in part or whole its denial of Daniel's
motion for a new trial, is so flawed that it undermines the very footing on which the trial
court's denial of a new trial stands.
It is also remarkable, sadly so, that the trial court could choose to characterize its
brief encounter with Daniel on the day of trial as not having an "opportunity" to
determine whether Daniel qualified as an indigent. The trial court clearly had an
opportunity to take a few minutes to engage Daniel in some sort of colloquy about his
indigence, competence, or his desire to represent himself. Instead, in its rush to clear
another misdemeanor from the calendar, the trial court ignored Daniel's fundamental
rights.
Equally remarkable, the trial court consumed considerable trial court time in
hearings on Daniel's request for a new trial. Such time exceeded by a factor of two the
combined amount of time for the initial trial plus the estimated time for a new trial. Yet,
he trial court seems to base much of its reasoning on an efficiency theory. That is, the
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reason for denying Daniel's request for an attorney was in part because his request came
to the trial court's attention at the last minute, thereby potentially creating a thirty minute
gap in the trial court's calendar that day, February 21, 1996.
CONCLUSION
Daniel clearly has a right to retain counsel to assist him in his defense. The trial
court denied him this fundamental right, which substantially and adversely affected him
when he was found guilty after bench trial and without mounting any defense. The trial
court also erred by not granting a continuance so that Daniel could retain counsel; and
again erred by not granting Daniel's request for a new trial when it was clear that
Daniel's fundamental rights were trampled upon. The Court of Appeals should reverse
the judgment below. The better view, however, and in the interests of justice, the Court
of Appeals should not burden Daniel or the trial court with another trial, albeit brief; it
should dismiss the charge against Daniel.

DATED this 2nd day of January 1997.

^lli'dtyCah^—
MICHAEL A. JENSEN, Esq. (7231)
Counsel for Daniel Longcrier

darnel bnefl.app January 2. 1997
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03,11
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DOB:
Sex:
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P Race: W
547-1798
Yes

A g e : 19
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LONGCRIER, DANIEL
512 N 2200 W
Layton, UT 84041

DOB: 0 7 - 2 9 - 7 6
Sex: M Race: W
HP: 5 4 7 - 1 7 9 8
Testify:

A g e : 18
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WP:
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N a m e : PHILLIPS, JOHN
A d d r : 512 N 2200 W
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N a m e : PHILLIPS, KEHLI
A d d r : 512 W 2200 W
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AKA:

DOB: 0 4 - 0 8 - 7 8
Sex: F Race: W
HP: 5 4 7 - 1 7 9 8
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WP:
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IAYTON CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT
CONTINUATION SHEET
PAGE: 1
RID: 231795.AP043
OFFICER: King
SUBJECT: Family fight

DR#: 9503443

On 06-16-95 at 2330 hours, RO responded to 2200 W on a family fight
prior.
RO spoke to the victim, a 19 year old female.
RO
determined an assault took place. RO also spoke to two witnesses.
RO was unable to locate the suspect- RO did complete a complaint
questionnaire-

On 06-16-95 at 233 0 hours, a Stephanie Owen at 512 N 2200 W
contacted this agency regarding a fight with her live in boyfriend.
Stephanie indicated that the boyfriend had left the area, but she
wished to speak to an officer.
RO did speak to Stephanie at her home. Stephanie indicated that
she had been assaulted by her boyfriend, Daniel Longcrier.
Stephanie also stated that Daniel brandished a knife also.
Stephanie stated that she and Daniel have a child together and do
live together.
Stephanie provided the following facts to RO. Stephanie and Daniel
began arguing in Bountiful at 1800 hours. Stephanie stated Daniel
is regularly using crank (methamphetamine) and that he was under
the influence on this date. Stephanie stated that Daniel tried to
get some money from her to buy crank. Stephanie stated Daniel
tried to take her planner and she refused. Daniel twisted her neck
and hit her. This occurred in Bountiful.
Stephanie stated at 2100 hours, at their home, Daniel placed a
stereo, television, vcr, and • computer in his truck. Stephanie
stated that Daniel was going to pawn the items to buy more crank.
Stephanie stated she tried to get the computer back and a fight
ensued. Stephanie stated that she took Daniel's keys and that
Daniel pulled a knife out and pointed the knife at her. Stephanie
stated that Daniel demanded to have his keys back.
Stephanie
stated that a friend, John Phillips and his wife Kehli Phillips
were present. Stephanie stated John stepped in and Daniel threw
the knife out into the street. Stephanie stated that Daniel then
ripped her clothes off. RO did observe a pair of levis that were
torn open. Stephanie stated Daniel was slapping at her and calling
her names. Stephanie stated Daniel then left with another friend,
but later returned to get his truck.
RO observed no physical signs or injury.on Stephanie. RO asked
Stephanie if she would like to speak to a victim's advocate.
Stephanie declined.
RO did have Stephanie, John, and Kehli,
complete witness statements.
RO was not able to locate Daniel. RO did complete a complaint
questionnaire for assault against Daniel. RO did ask Stephanie to
contact RO if Daniel returned home.
RO has no further details at this time,

eor 6-19-95 mak
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437 N. Wasatch Drive
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For Defendant:

Michael A. Jensen
900 First Interstate Plaza
170 South Main
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1655

1

April 16, 1996

2

3:00 P.M.
PROCEEDINGS

3
4
5
6

THE COURT:

Miss Hunt, do you have, is that your understanding, do you have

evidence.
MS. HUNT:

Your Honor, it is my understanding that this was set for an evidentiary

7

hearing, but it's the city's position, at this point, that really the court does not need to hold an

8

evidentiary hearing because, and I don't know if the court has had an opportunity to read the

9

memorandum that's been prepared by Mr. Garside on this, but-

10
11
12

THE COURT:

I'm part way through that, but we were at judges' meetings when

that was filed and I simply haven't had a chanceMS. HUNT:

That's right. I knew that the court, Your Honor, had been out of town

13

and so, but the city's position, basically, is that the only issue to be resolved by the court is

14

whether or not the defendant had a right to appointed counsel and that if the court finds that the

15

defendant did have such a right, then the court probably should vacate the trial. But it's the

16

city's position that, and recommendation, that the court proceed to sentencing in this matter and

17

the city's recommendation is that the court impose no jail time on the defendant, but only impose

18

afinefor this matter. And then the city takes the position that if the court imposes no jail time,

19

that there's no actual jail time for this offense, then the defendant has no right to counsel. And,

20

therefore, there is no need to make any finding in the record that the defendant knowingly and

21

voluntarily waived that right because there isn't such a right. And there's a recent Utah case on

22

this, Salt Lake City v. Grotepas where the defendant was charged with an infraction and the

23

court ordered the defendant to pay a fine as a result of that. The defendant was represented by

24

counsel at trial and then appealed the conviction on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel.

25

And the court decided that because the defendant had no right to counsel, then the court could

4
1

not consider whether or not the counsel was effective or ineffective simply because there was

2

no right to counsel to begin with. And there's some prior Utah case law that says even though

3

in Grotepas you have a situation where the defendant was charged with an infraction, and there

4

was no possibility of jail time, the court took that clear, the U.S. Supreme Court and the Utah

5

Courts, that the proper inquiry is not whether or not there is a possibility of jail time, but whether

6

there is actual jail time imposed on the defendant. And, so in this case, if there were no jail time

7

imposed on Mr. Longcrier as part of his sentence for this offense, that he would have no right

8

to counsel. And there being no right to counsel, there's no need for the court to make any

9

inquiry into whether or not he normally and voluntarily waived his right to counsel. So that's

10

the position the city is taking and I think based on that, it really would be moot for the court to

11

hold an evidentiary hearing as to what the defendant knew. If the court were to find that, for

12

example, that the defendant talked to me in the hall and asked about appointed counsel and I told

13

him very clearly and plainly that he would have to request counsel from the court and explained

14

to him the whole procedure for doing that, even if the court found that that happened, and the

15

court made nofindingin the record that the defendant voluntarily and knowingly waived his right

16

to counsel, then the court still would be precluded from imposing any jail time, as I read the case

17

law. So whether or not that occurred is really a moot issue.

18

THE COURT:

19

MR. JENSEN: Your Honor, Mr. Garside responded to our Motion for a new trial,

20

and I received it on Friday, and cited a line cases, all of which related to the taxpayers picking

21

up appointed counsel or taxpayer paid transcripts. There was not a single case cited which

22

denied the defendant the right to counsel. It is only balancing the need for counsel and the

23

possible imposition or penalty of imprisonment, but none of them dealt with why the counsel—

24

THE COURT: Doesn't the Grotepas case expressly deal with the right to counsel in

25

a criminal case9

Alright, thank you. Mr. Jensen, why don't you go ahead.

5
1
2

MR. JENSEN: Only for indigents. All of those were indigents. All of those were
taxpayers and if you read the Scott case —

3

THE COURT: Well, it doesn't turn on any tax question. You're not saying to the

4

court it turns on the question of the taxpayers being involved. It really turned on the question

5

whether or not that defendant had the right to counsel period.

6

MR. JENSEN: No.

7

THE COURT: It didn't?

8

MR. JENSEN: No, Your Honor. In fact, they rely on the Scott case, which is the

9

U.S. Supreme Court case on which they rely, all of this derives, and the Scott case was simply

10

on indigency. And if you read the text of that case, you will see that this was really a balancing

11

to preserve the rights guaranteed in the Constitution versus the rights of burdening the courts

12

with providing counsel for every little petty offense.

13

THE COURT: Have you read Grotepas?

14

MR. JENSEN: Yes, I have.

15

THE COURT: Did he not have his own counsel at trial?

16

MR. JENSEN: Yes, he did.

17

THE COURT: And didn't the appeal go up on ineffective counsel?

18

MR. JENSEN: It did, Your Honor.

19

THE COURT: Well, what does that have to do with taxes?

20

MR. JENSEN: Well, I'm just saying that the whole line case, all those were indigent

21

cases.

22

THE COURT: Grotepas wasn't indigent.

23

MR. JENSEN: No, but what they were doing is they were analogizing ineffective

24

counsel claims to all of the indigent claims. And besides, Grotepas is simply an infraction. There

25

was never any possibility of imprisonment.

6

1

THE COURT:

2

MR. JENSEN: Oh, yes, on that-

3

THE COURT: That was precisely the point of the Court of, of the Supreme Court

4
5
6

Yes, well I'm saying, yes, you're right.

when they reversed the Court of Appeals.
MR. JENSEN: Yes, but what I'm saying is, what I'm trying to suggest is that the
infraction, okay, never had the possibility of imprisonment.

7

THE COURT: Yes, that's correct.

8

MR. JENSEN: Now, if we follow the theory that the prosecution would like this court

9

to adopt, what it is really saying is that this court, from here after, could deny counsel [to a

10

defendant] whether he wanted to pay for it himself or not, as long as you didn't impose

11

imprisonment, you can't have counsel. And so if the court looked at the record before and

12

decided that this was not a case in which it was going to impose imprisonment, but was just

13

going to impose a conviction of penalty, this court could then say, "sorry, you don't have a right

14

to counsel." " I don't care whether you can pay for it or not, you have no right to counsel."

15

And we never reached that point in this case. This defendant was never given an opportunity to

16

either select his own counsel or get court appointed counsel. And so, you can't take these line

17

of cases as now saying that every defendant that comes before this court is going to be denied

18

counsel, or, if they are imprisoned, then they have a right of appeal, but if they aren't imprisoned,

19

tough. You know, you could impose a thousand dollars, two thousand dollar fine, conviction,

20

whatever, but you don't have a right to counsel. These line of cases are very different than the

21

present case, Your Honor.

22

THE COURT: Do you really think that the necessary extension of what Ms. Hunt is

23

arguing for is that the court could deny counsel even if the defendant wanted to retain his or her

24

own counsel?

25

MR. JENSEN: You bet, because that's exactly what has happened in this case. This

1

individual, Daniel, did not choose to have his own counsel. He didn't choose not to have

2

counsel at all.

3

THE COURT: What did he choose? Tell me what he chose.

4

MR. JENSEN: He thought, he was under the impression, that when he came to this

5

court, he was going have court appointed counsel.

6

THE COURT: Can you tell the court where he got that idea?

7

MR. JENSEN: Well, if we can put him on the stand, Your Honor. Would that be

8

alright?

9

THE COURT: Sure, you can put him on. He needs to be sworn. Would you raise

10

your right hand to be sworn?

11

CLERK:

12

Do you solemnly swear that the testimony about to be given is the truth, the

whole truth and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

13

MR. LONGCRIER:

14

MR. JENSEN: Mr. Longcrier, would you please tell the court when you first

15
16
17
18
19
20
21

I do.

requested—
THE COURT: Mr. Jensen, I think we better make a record. We better make a record
on his name and his address so that we know who he is.
MR. JENSEN: Oh, okay, I'm sorry. Would you please state your name and address
for the record?
MR. LONGCRIER:' My name is Daniel Longcrier. I live at 418 West Center Street
in Bountiful, Utah.

22

THE COURT: Please go ahead.

23

MR. JENSEN: Mr. Longcrier, sometime earlier this year, there was a hearing, a plea

24
25

hearing. Can you tell us what happened at that hearing regarding an attorney9
MR. LONGCRIER:

I really can't remember everything that happened

I can't

8
1

remember, really

2

MR JENSEN

You can't remember anything?

3

MR LONGCRIER

Yea, I talked, at the plea, I talked to Miss Hunt outside and she

4

said that, um, I asked her if I could have an attorney and she said, um, I don't know her exact

5

words, but basically, she told me I had to come to the court for an attorney

6

MR JENSEN

So, then what did you do next?

7

MR LONGCRIER

So, let's see, I called the court house and they told me, I talked

8

to the secretary She told me that when I got to court, I could have one appointed to me All

9

I had to do is talk to the judge

10

MR JENSEN

11

MR LONGCRIER

12

And then what happened when you got to court?

I didn't And I asked him if I could get one and he told me that I couldn't

13

MR JENSEN

14

MR LONGCRIER

15

MR JENSEN

16

MR LONGCRIER

17

MR JENSEN

18

And where did that conversation take place?
It's just outside, in the court house lobby

Before the trial?
Yea, before

Let's just make this very clear He said to you, you asked him if you

had an attorney?

19
20

I asked the prosecuting attorney if I had a lawyer and he told me

MR LONGCRIER

Yea, and he said that if I didn't have one, then I couldn't have

one

21

MR JENSEN

So if you didn't have one, you couldn't have one

22

MR LONGCRIER

Well, I think his words were, um, you don't have an attorney,

23

and I told him no And he said, well, that's too bad And I said, can I get one, and he just didn't

24

answer me nothing, just basically said no

25

MR JENSEN

Had you sought out a private attorney any time in between?

9
1

MR LONGCRIER

2

MR JENSEN

3

MR LONGCRIER

4

MR JENSEN

Your Honor

5

THE COURT

Thank you You may sit down Ms Hunt, you may cross examine

6

MS HUNT

I don't have any questions

7

THE COURT

The court has a couple of questions Mr Longcrier, do you watch

8

No, I didn't

And why didn't you?
I thought that I would be granted one when I came to court

TV?

9

MR LONGCRIER

10

THE COURT

A little bit

Did you get the idea from watching television sets, pardon me,

11

television programs that deal with legal cases, that the court would appoint for you from that

12

source'?

13

MR LONGCRIER

14

THE COURT

15

Did you ever watch a law case, court case on television where

appointment of an attorney was the subject matter of the program?

16

MR LONGCRIER

17

THE COURT

18

lawyer for you?
MR LONGCRIER

20

THE COURT

22

No, not really

Tell us, where did you get the idea that the court would appoint a

19

21

I don't see what you mean

I called the secretary and she said I could get one appointed

Did she just say it just that way or did she put some qualifications on

it
MR LONGCRIER

She said, I asked her, I said, I need to get a court appointed

23

attorney How do I go about getting one and she said, just come in on the day of your trial and

24

ask the judge for one

25

THE COURT

And so, did you do that9

10
1
2

MR LONGCRIER
appointed one

3

THE COURT

4

MR LONGCRIER

5

THE COURT

6

MR LONGCRIER

7

THE COURT

8

Well, did you ask the judge for a lawyer?

Why didn't you ask the judge for a lawyer?
I didn't know how to get in contact with the judge

When you were in the court, you came in and entered a plea, did you

MR LONGCRIER

10

THE COURT

11

MR LONGCRIER

12

THE COURT

13

MR LONGCRIER

14

THE COURT

15

MR LONGCRIER

17

No

ask for one then?

9

16

Well, I kind of got the feeling that I wasn't going to be

At the plea?

Well, at any time Have you ever asked the court for a lawyer?
I did right before my trial

On the day of trial?
On the day of trial, I asked for one

At any time before that, did you request a lawyer?
From the state, no, not except for when I called to the court

house
THE COURT

In other words, when you first came in for what we call arraignment,

18

you didn't ask for one then and at the time you entered your plea in this case, you didn't ask for

19

a lawyer at that time, I guess?

20

MR LONGCRIER

21

THE COURT

22

No, I didn't know I was suppose to

And then when you came back for pre-tnal is that when you talked

to Ms Hunt?

23

MR LONGCRIER

24

THE COURT

25

MR LONGCRIER

Urn, I believe so

And she told you to ask the court for a lawyer?
I don't remember exactly what she said, but it was something

11
about that.
THE COURT: But, at the pre-trial, you didn't do that?
MR LONGCRIER:

No

THE COURT: Why didn't you do that?
MR. LONGCRIER:

I wasn't aware that I was suppose get in touch with you right

away, (inaudible).
THE COURT: But the clerk had told you that you should ask the judge?
MR LONGCRIER:

Yea.

THE COURT: When did you expect you would ask the judge?
MR. LONCRDER:

She said to come in the day of my trial and the judge would

grant one to you.
THE COURT: Those are her words?
MR. LONGCRIER:

Not her exact words, no.

THE COURT: What are her exact words as near as you remember?
MR. LONGCRIER:

I called on the phone. I asked, I need to get a court appointed

attorney and —
THE COURT: But, I think you mentioned that you were talking to Ms. Hunt and I
think you quoted her words a moment ago. I'm asking you to tell the court what you can
remember about her words, not a telephone call.
MR LONGCRIER:

Oh

THE COURT: When you were here at pre-trial talking to Ms. Hunt, what did she
say?
MR. LONGCRIER.

The only thing I remember about our conversation was that she

told me that I had to come to the court house. I don't remember her exact words, (inaudible)
THE COURT: Do you know who Ms. Hunt is9

12
1

MR. LONGCRIER

2

THE COURT: Did you come to a pre-trial and have a face to face conversation with

3

Yea.

her?

4

MR. LONGCRIER:

5

THE COURT: She wouldn't have been here for your plea if we assume—

6

MR. LONGCRIER:

7

THE COURT: Alright and what did she tell you about getting a lawyer appointed at

8
9

I can't remember if it was my pre-trial or my plea that we talked.

It was my pre-trial.

the pre-trial hearing?
MR. LONGCRIER.

I don't remember.

10

THE COURT: Thank you. Mr. Jensen, anything further?

11

MR. JENSEN: I have just a couple of questions, Your Honor.

12

THE COURT: Yes. Redirect. You can ask whatever you want that's relevant.

13

MR. JENSEN: Did you, at any time, on the day of the trial or any time prior,

14

expressly state that you wanted to waive your right to counsel?

15

MR. LONGCRIER:

16

MR. JENSEN: Were you ever asked if you wanted to waive your right to counsel?

17

MR. LONGCRIER:

18

MR. JENSEN: Did you ever express to the court or anyone else that you wanted to

19

No.

I can't remember if I was asked that question.

represent yourself?

20

MR. LONGCRIER:

21

MR. JENSEN: That's all, Your Honor.

22

THE COURT: Thank you. Anything Ms. Hunt?

23

MS. HUNT

No.

24

THE COURT

You may step down, Mr. Longcrier. Do you want to complete your

25

No.

presentation, Mr. Jensen, to the court9

13
1

MR. JENSEN: Yes, Your Honor. It is very clear a defendant like Daniel has a right

2

to either represent himself or to have counsel. If he chooses one, he has waived the other. If he

3

chooses to represent himself, he's waived his right to counsel. But he has to make some

4

expressed waiver for that to happen. In this case, there is no evidence that he ever desired to

5

represent himself or waived his right for counsel. The record is just the opposite. It's very clear

6

that he thought he was going to be represented by counsel. He asked to be represented by

7

counsel.

8

THE COURT: When did he ask? When did he ask?

9

MR. JENSEN: Well, he asked on those two occasions.

10
11

THE COURT: Well, he asked on one, he testified about. He said he asked at the time
of trial, but he wasn't—

12

MR. JENSEN: He asked Your Honor on the day of trial, that's correct. But he

13

didn't, (inaudible) at the same, he didn't say (inaudible) have the presence of mind to say, well,

14

if I can't get a court appointed counsel, then I want to see if I can get some other counsel.

15

THE COURT: But on the day of trial, Mr. Jensen, surely you wouldn't expect if

16

parties are here prepared to go ahead that the court's going to grant a continuance for him to go

17

and seek counsel when he's already been told that he should have requested it earlier than that.

18

You wouldn't expect the court to say, yes, we're going to stop everything now and send these

19

witnesses home so you can go and talk about counsel, to see if you can get counsel or whatever

20

you would like to do.

21

MR. JENSEN. Well, it certainly would have been appropriate even if you were in the

22

middle of the trial if the counsel became ineffective for the courts to protect the rights of the

23

defendant by making sure that due counsel was appointed (inaudible).

24
25

THE COURT: That's Ms. Hunt's argument, thougn. If the court isn't going to
imprison, he doesn't have that right.

14
1
2

MR. JENSEN: But the point is, at the time, there is no assurance. The prosecution
at the very time that he was being denied counsel was recommending prison time.

3

THE COURT: Well, jail time. Imprisonment.

4

MR. JENSEN: Imprisonment, confinement.

That was the situation. So at that

5

particular time, he had no rights to represent himself, I mean, to have counsel. That's all I'm

6

saying. And, furthermore, because of what actually transpired at the trial, that is, his wife was

7

compelled to get on the witness stand against him.

8

THE COURT: Does that strike — do you practice much criminal law?

9

MR. JENSEN: No, I don't, Your Honor.

10
11

THE COURT: Let me, would you believe that every day in courts along the Wasatch
front,

parties are subpoenaed, maybe are reluctant to testify and come to court, and would rather

12

not testify, but unless they have a privilege and exercise it, or unless they have a 5th amendment

13

privilege and exercise, they have to testify. That's the way it works.

14

MR. JENSEN: But a wife cannot be compelled to testify against her husband.

15

THE COURT: If she invokes her privilege.

16

MR. JENSEN: It's his privilege.

17

THE COURT: If he invokes the privilege. Neither one did.

18

MR. JENSEN. That's what I'm saying that without counsel....

19

THE COURT: Well, can I presume with him sitting there, or any court presume with

20

him sitting there, that he has not chosen to represent himself?

21

MR. JENSEN: I think there has to be an express, the court has a duty to—.

22

THE COURT: No, no.

23

MR. JENSEN. Oh, yes, Your Honor, in the case of Ruple The case is so clear, in

24
25

fact, it's so parallel to this situation, State v. Ruple
THE COURT: What was the in charge in that case9

15
MR. JENSEN. Your Honor, I can't find it quickly here. I have the case here with me,
but I can find it in just a moment.
MS. HUNT:

I can tell it was a felony.

THE COURT: Ms Hunt.
MS. HUNT:

The charge. I think it was a distribution of marijuana felony charge

in that case.
THE COURT: It was a felony charge?
MS HUNT:

Yes.

THE COURT: That's all I needed to know, thank you.
MR. JENSEN: Well, I don't know if it was a felony charge. We'll look at it and see.
But what I'm suggesting is that the defendant in that case parallels Daniel very, quite a bit, in
terms of his education. The court took that into consideration, and took into consideration his
education. He did not finish high school. He was dyslexia. He had never had experience. He
had never had experience in a trial before, had no possible way of properly representing himself.
And the court said that the trial court erred. It should have taken that into account; it should
have given him and looked at his rights very carefully in that case.
THE COURT: OK, I'll look at that. Anything else you want to tell the court?
MR. JENSEN: There is one other, one other case that I would like to also look at.
It is also very relevant to that. And that is State v. Drobel a 1991 case.
THE COURT: What state is that in?
MR. JENSEN: Utah. 815 P.2nd 724.

Again, he asked to represent himself which

the court granted. He was convicted. Again, the issue really is the competency of the individual
to be able to represent himself in a court like this. But, in this case, again, he never said he
wanted to represent himself and he never said he wanted to waive the right to counsel. And
that's the, I think that's really the crux of it here i s -

16
1

THE COURT: Well, you may be right, but I guess you're not saying to the court that

2

if a person chooses to exercise his or her constitutional right to represent himself, it doesn't

3

matter how much education he has, does it?

4

MR. JENSEN: Well, it may not matter except that the court should make a reasonable

5

inquiry as to the person's competence to be able to do that before they let them represent

6

themself. And both those the cases addressed that issue. The court had a duty to make an

7

inquiry of the individual to see if they reasonably could [represent themself]. You certainly

8

wouldn't let a totally incompetent person say, CT want to represent myself," when they really

9

couldn't do that, because you would know that they couldn't possibly have a fair trial under

10
11
12

those circumstances.
THE COURT: I don't know. I suppose if a totally incompetent person, I would
concede that. You don't claim that Mr. Longcrier falls in that category?

13

MR. JENSEN: No, I don't, Your Honor, but I'm just suggesting that the cases I've

14

just cited took into account the degree of their sophistication and their knowledge and their

15

competency, and that was a factor.

16

THE COURT: Alright.

17

MR. JENSEN:

18

THE COURT: I think not. Thank you and I'd like to hear from Ms. Hunt if she has

19
20

Is there anything else, Your Honor?

anything she would like to tell the court.
MS. HUNT:

No, no.

First of all, counsel's summary of the city's position

21

(inaudible) thing that (inaudible) defendant any counsel (inaudible). But what this case boils

22

down to is whether or not defendant has the right to appointed counsel, and while the court at

23

this point, it's kinda difficult to go back and determine whether or not the defendant was indigent

24

for the purpose of the simple reason, we assume (inaudible).

25

indigent, urn, (inaudible) but even assuming that the defendant was indigent, (inaudible) actually

Assuming that the defendant is

17
1

imposes jail time to this defendant, there is never any right to court appointed counsel. And if

2

there's not a right to court appointed counsel, then there's no need to vacate the trial that

3

happened. The defendant, whether he waives his right to counsel, the court does not need to ask

4

defendants who aren't entitled, who don't have those rights to counsel, whether or not they

5

waive their right to go out and hire their own attorney. It's just for those that choose to do that.

6

I think we should assume that everybody knows that you go out and hire an attorney to represent

7

them unless they're told otherwise and they never would be told that. For a defendant to come

8

to court and say I didn't know I could hire an attorney to represent me because the court never

9

told me that, it is beyond the realm of comprehension. But the cases cited by the city all are on

10

the point of right to counsel. And the case that counsel talked about, as far as the case that

11

involves the defendant's request for a transcript, provided at taxpayer's expense, that's Murray

12

City v. Robinson. The way that the court decided that was that the court said the issue of

13

whether or not a transcript will be provided is totally dependent on whether or not the defendant

14

in this case had a right to counsel.

15

THE COURT: To court appointed counsel.

16

MS. HUNT:

Court appointed counsel, that's right. And in this case, the court said

17

that there having been no actual jail time imposed for the offense, there is no right to counsel or

18

court appointed counsel. And therefore, there is no right to have transcripts provided at

19

taxpayer's expense. And the court in that decision stated Robinson, while she may have faced

20

the mere threat of imprisonment (inaudible). Moreover, we cannot speculate about Robinson's

21

potential sentence, because Robinson's conviction resulted in a fine only. And so, it's the city's

22

position that if the court in this case does not impose jail time, then there's no need to go back

23

and say at the time of the trial, was there a potential for jail time? There's no need to speculate

24

about that In fact, if the court imposes absolutely no jail time for this offense, there is no right

25

for court appointed counsel. Then there's no need for anyone to ever ask the defendant whether

18
1

or not he wanted to waive his right to counsel, if there wasn't a right. And the courts have said

2

a right to counsel is a fundamental right, it is not an absolute right. (Inaudible), so again, the city

3

recommends that the court proceed with sentencing, and sentence the defendant to pay a fine and

4

the possibility of a counseling program and a term of probation, but not impose any jail time.

5

(Inaudible)

6

THE COURT: Alright, thank you. Mr. Jensen, you get the last word.

7

MR. JENSEN: It is true that Mr. Longcrier didn't secure private counsel. The

8

prosecution suggests that he had that right and he could have done that, and just because he

9

didn't, they can't be blamed. But the issue is, and I believe from his testimony here today, that

10

he was under the clear perception that an attorney would be appointed for him here. I don't

11

think that was unreasonable. It's a simple trial. The trial shouldn't last more than 30 minutes.

12

It's a simple case. I don't believe the prosecution prepared very much for this. They didn't have

13

to.

14

THE COURT: Well, I don't think you would know about that, Mr. Jensen.

15

MR. JENSEN: Well, I do for the sense that they told me how long the trial was.

16

THE COURT: Well, I don't know that that would tell you how long they prepared

17

fork.

18

MR. JENSEN: Oh, the prosecution.

19

THE COURT: Yes, that was your statement.

20

MR. JENSEN: It's speculation. It's a very simple case. All I'm saying is that he was

21

under the perception that he was going to have a court appointed attorney. So when he arrives

22

here and he was denied that, now -1 don't know if it was one day or two days when I was called

23

- so when he was denied that on the day of trial, I was called either that night or the next day

24

because the sentencing was either the next day or two days later. So he did take action once he

25

was told by the court that he couldn't have a court appointed attorney. There was never an

19
1

inquiry as to whether he was indigent or not, and so there can't be anything based on whether

2

he is or is not indigent. That was never at issue because it was never inquired of him. In fact,

3

at the last hearing, Mr. Garside contended that Daniel Longcrier probably would not qualify for

4

a court appointed attorney. It's just his speculation.

5

THE COURT; Well, is it your position before the court today in arguing this motion

6

that he should have been offered court appointed counsel and, that if offered, he would have

7

qualified?

8
9

MR. JENSEN: No, not at all. That's just backwards. You have to first be qualified
and then have a court appointed attorney.

10

THE COURT: Well, a -

11

MR. JENSEN: In his own mind-

12

THE COURT: Something has to trigger the whole discussion about court appointed

13

counsel, doesn't it?

14

MR. JENSEN: In his own mind, because of his low income, he lives in subsidized

15

housing, and he gets Medicaid and he gets other state assistance, in his own mind, he thought

16

that he probably would qualify for some kind of appointed counsel. Whether he does or he

17

doesn't is a fact question that would have to be determined; but it was never inquired, so he just

18

thought he was going to have it.

19

THE COURT: What do you think should trigger that inquiry?

20

MR. JENSEN. When he asked for a court appointed attorney.

21

THE COURT: In court?

22

MR. JENSEN. Absent any other instructions or directions, yes.

23

THE COURT: OK

24

MR JENSEN. He was told to come to court.

25

THE COURT: When did he ask in court?

20
MR. JENSEN: It was my understanding at the beginning of the trial.
THE COURT: OK, don't you think that's an unreasonable point at which a party
should ask for counsel?
MR. JENSEN: I think it would only be unreasonable if the person asking had some
prior knowledge or understanding or instructions or something. But this person—
THE COURT: Wasn't his testimony here on the witness stand that Ms. Hunt did tell
him at pre-trial? He had to ask the court for court appointed counsel and he didn't ask for it at
the pre-trial.
MR. JENSEN: I understand he asked Ms. Hunt after the pre-trial on the way out. So
he went home, and subsequent to then he called the court. If he had asked before (inaudible),
I could understand that.
THE COURT: That's what I assumed his testimony meant. See, the pre-trial is
between counsel and the party first, before they ever come into court. They talk then. They
don't talk afterwards. I don't know what Ms Hunt's recollection of that is. Ordinarily, the
discussion with Ms. Hunt would be before he came into court.
MR. JENSEN: My client told me that it was on the way out, afterwards. So what I'm
saying, I don't think that's unreasonable for him to ask at that point in time because that's the
limit of his knowledge It would have been a very small burden on the court to simply say,
"Now, are you really prepared to represent yourself on this or would you rather seek private
counsel?" But there was ho inquiry made.
THE COURT: Mr. Jensen, as you say, you don't practice criminal law much, but I
suppose if you went into circuit court and watched how misdemeanor cases flow, you would
realize how impractical that is. If the court were to ask people, are you sure you want to go
ahead now, or do you feel that you would like to have counsel, in 90% of the cases, the
defendant would say, oh yes, I guess I better go talk to counsel. And you wouldn't be trying any

21

1

misdemeanor cases. We have to cover that ground ahead of the time of the trial. It simply

2

makes no sense to get to the trial time with witnesses sitting here and counsel ready to go and

3

have a party say, oh, gee, I guess I really need a lawyer. You can see that can't you?

4

MR. JENSEN: Again, I can see it has to be balanced with the defendant's rights for

5

counsel. By the same token, if you're in the middle of the trial, if he had retained me or

6

somebody else, I was here and died in front of this court, the court would certainly grant a

7

continuance to get new counsel.

8

THE COURT: Well, yes, that's a whole different ball game there.

9

MR. JENSEN: Why is it?

10

THE COURT: It's a totally unexpected event where he has brought counsel with him

11

and he expects to have the assistance of counsel and doesn't have it suddenly. And that's a

12

whole different ball game than for him to come here and create the impression with everyone

13

concerned that he's got to represent himself That he's made that choice. He has not requested

14

counsel before the beginning of the trial. He's going to represent himself and then he doesn't

15

like the outcome of the trial, so a day later, he called you. Now that's the kind of scenario we

16

have, isn't it?

17

MR. JENSEN: Except for one thing.

18

THE COURT: OK, what?

19

MR. JENSEN: Clearly, all the evidence that's been put before this court shows that

20

Mr. Longcrier expected counsel to represent him at his trial. There's nothing to the contrary.

21

Nobody has been able to present any evidence to the contrary to that.

22

THE COURT: Well, when you're trying to look into a person's mind, you know,

23

being a law trained person, that we have to look at the outward indicia, the outward indications,

24

and it's hard to know what his expectation was unless we look at the way he behaved

25

behaved as a person who came to court expecting to represent himself and not expecting to have

He

22
counsel. That's what his behavior showed us.
MR. JENSEN: Even though he asked for counsel?
THE COURT: No he didn't ask for counsel until the moment of trial, and he's not
about to get counsel at the moment of the trial when that's his first request of the court. Isn't
that true, here? Doesn't all the evidence show, including his statements here on the witness
stand, that he made no request for trial until the commencement of the trial.
MR. JENSEN: He was told by the court personnel that that was the procedure.
THE COURT: No, I don't accept that he was told that that was the procedure. He
was told somewhere along the line, he testified, by telephone call to the clerk that he should ask
the court for counsel. And I gather from the time frame that he testified about that, that it came
prior to the pre-trial. You're saying it was afterwards?
MR. JENSEN: Oh, yes. Oh, definitely. I believe it was the day before the trial. He
was told to come to the court and ask for counsel. (Inaudible). If you would like, we could put
him on the stand. It was very clear that he was told to come to court at his trial and ask for
counsel. Based on that, there was no other expectation that he had.
THE COURT: Alright. Anything further? I'll look at the cases you cited and the
ones Ms. Hunt cited and make a decision.
MR. JENSEN: Thank you, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Alright. Thank you Ms. Hunter.

(Proceedings concluded)
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heard from him?
MR GARSIDE

Yes, Your Honor

THE COURT

Mr Longcner would you stand up please? We would like you to

come up to this table over here on your left, sir Is the city ready to proceed?
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MR GARSIDE
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They said that when I called that I could ask

(Proceedings concluded)
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Gary R. Crane • City Attorney
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FAX: (801) 546-8535

March 26, 1996

Michael A. Jensen
Attorney at Law
First Interstate Plaza, Suite 900
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1655
Re:

Layton City vs. Daniel Longcrier

Dear Mr. Jensen:
This letter is in response to your request that I reduce to writing the proposed plea negotiation. This
is per our telephone conversation on Friday, March 22, 1996. The City is willing to reduce the
charge from assault to one of disorderly conduct, a class "C" Misdemeanor. Upon Mr. Longcrier's
plea of guilty to that amended charge, the City will recommend that no jail time be imposed, that the
Defendant be given the opportunity to do community service in lieu of fines, or a combination
thereof, and that the Defendant be required to attend counseling to address this incident.
With regard to our discussion regarding expungement, the applicable provision is § 77-18-12(2)(d).
As stated, it is a three (3) year period.
If the aforementioned is not your understanding of my proposal, please contact me immediately to
alleviate any misunderstandings. Otherwise, I await your response.
Sincerely,

side
y Attorney

Tab 5

SECOND CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
DAVIS COUNTY, LAYTON DEPARTMENT
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
STATE OF UTAH, bv and through
LAYTON CITY, a Municipal Corporation.
Plaintiff,
v.

PANISL IQNGCRIEP,
Defendant

Case No.

951001606

Date

6-14-96

Judge

Bean

MATTER: DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR ARREST OF JUDGMENT OR NEW
TRIAL

The Court took Defendant's alternative Motion under advisement to consider the
arguments advanced by counsel at the hearing, the authorities cited by each side,
and the history of the case's progression dom arraignment to the filing of that
Motion.
Defendant was charged with assault by Information filed July 2 1 , 1995. A
Summons and Order for booking was issued that same day and served on
Defendant by delivery to his mother August 14, 1995. Defendant appeared for
arraignment August 23, 1995. He appeared alone, representing himself. He
entered a not guilty plea and pretrial was set for October 11,1 995. Defendant
received a Notice of Pretrial that had lines for "Defendant", "Plaintiff's Attorney"
and "Defendant's Attorney" printed within less than an inch of each other on the
form. Defendant's signature on the Notice is within five-eighths of an inch of the
reference to "Defendant's Attorney." Defendant was given a copy of the Notice.
The pretrial had to be reset to a week later, but Defendant did not receive notice of
the new date because he'd moved and had not given the clerk his new address.
Defendant appeared for pretrial on October 1 1 , 1995, and was told about the new
date. Defendant appeared alone, representing himself, on that date. He was given

2
a copy of the Notice of the new setting; it referred to "ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT"
just above the line for Defendant's signature.
Defendant appeared for pretrial on October 18, 1995, and discussed the case with
the prosecutor. No negotiation was reached between them and the case was set
for trial on February 2 1 , 1 9 9 6 . Again, Defendant's signature appears
approximately one-half inch from the reference to "Defendant's A t t o r n e y " on the
Notice of Trial. Defendant appeared alone, representing himself, at the pretrial.
On February 2 1 , 1 9 9 6 , the case was called for trial. Defendant appeared alone,
representing himself. When the court asked the parties if they were ready to
proceed, the following colloquy occurred:
Court:

Is the city ready to proceed?

Mr. Garside:

We are, your honor.

Court:

Mr. Longcrier, are you ready to proceed?

Mr. Longcrier: I need an attorney. They said, when I called, that I could ask for
one.
Court:

Just have a seat, sir. The Court denies your request for a
continuance so that you could get a lawyer, and you may proceed,
Mr. Garside.

The Court considered the request untimely, and for that reason made no inquiry as
to whether Defendant qualified for appointed counsel. The trial proceeded and
Defendant was convicted on the evidence presented.
In State V. Penderville, 2 Utah 2d 2 8 1 , 2 7 2 P.2d 195 (Utah 1954), the Utah
Supreme Court dealt w i t h the reverse situation, but its observations about a
continuance are pertinent. The Court said:
On December 2, 1 9 5 2 , the trial court set the case for trial December
17, 1 9 5 2 . On the day before the trial was to commence the trial court
received a letter from appellant complaining about the service being
rendered by his attorney and requesting a postponement of the trial to
enable him to procure other counsel. Immediately after receipt of the
letter the trial court had the appellant brought before him to discuss
appellant's request. A transcription of shorthand notes of the
conversation had between the trial court and appellant constitutes a part
of the record. This record does not reveal a showing on the part of the
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appellant to the effect that his attorney had been unfaithful or
incompetent in preparing appellant's case, nor does it show that
appellant or his attorney were not ready for trial. The court did not err
in denying appellant's application for a postponement. . . . The
Constitution of this State provides: 'In criminal prosecutions the accused
shall have the right to appear and defend in person and by counsel'
Const, art. 1, § 12. . . . It is generally, if not universally held that the
accused in a criminal proceeding who is sui juris and not mentally
incompetent has the right to conduct his own defense without the aid of
counsel. An accused may not, however, having once elected to proceed
with the aid of counsel for purposes of delay or to obstruct the
proceeding against him advance successfully an insincere claim of his
right to defend in person.
That decision was reversed on appeal because the trial court allowed appointed
counsel to represent the defendant, in spite of the defendant's expressed desire to
represent himself, a right the court should have afforded him. But the Court's
comments about delay are on point for this case.
The prosecutor's argument, set forth in his brief, that the Defendant has no right to
the assistance of counsel unless he is sentenced to incarceration, is also directly in
point. Most of the cases cited there refer to court-appointed counsel. Because of
the timing of Defendant's request for appointed counsel, the Court did not have the
opportunity to determine whether he qualified or not.
The Court denies Defendants alternative Motion, and resets sentencing for
Monday, July 22, 1 9 9 6 , at 10:30 a.m. The clerk will notify both Defendant and
defense counsel. If that date or time is not convenient, counsel should telephone
the clerk and request a different setting.
The Court apologizes to counsel for the delay in getting this decision reduced to
writing and mailed.
r\
p.

1 J u d g e

Case No: 951001606 MC
Certificate of Mailing

I c e r t i f y t h a t on the

<9^day of

, /u A

,

I sent by first class mail a true and correct copy of the
attached document to the following:
MICHAEL A JENSEN
Atty for Defendant
FIRST INTERSTATE PLAZA
170 SOUTH MAIN, SUITE 900
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84101
Circuit Court Clerk

'
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ueputyClerk "

j(}rUc,

Circuit Court, State of Utah
Davis County, Layton Department
425 North Wasatch Drive, Layton, Utah 84041
(801) 5 4 6 - 2 4 8 4

Layton City
Plaintiff

Notice of Sentencing
VS

Case No.: 9 5 1 0 0 1 6 0 6 MC

Daniel Longcrier
60 West 1 9 5 0 South
Bountiful, UT 8 4 0 1 0
Defendant

You will please take notice that the above entitled case is set for
Sentencing
in the Circuit Court, Layton Department, 4 2 5 Wasatch Drive, Layton, Utah.
Date: July 2 2 , 1 9 9 6

Time: 10:30 a.m.

Courtroom: 1

A copy of this notice w a s mailed, postage pre-paid, to the above named defendant and to:
Michael Jensen
Attorney for Defendant
First Interstate Plaza
170 South Main, Suite 9 0 0
Salt Lake City, UT 8 4 1 0 1

YOUR FAILURE TO APPEAR AS INDICATED ON THIS FORM COULD RESULT
IN A BENCH WARRANT FOR YOUR ARREST.
Dated: July 9, 1 9 9 6 .

^fr^U

Court Clerk

In compliance with the Americans with Disabilities Act, individuals needing special
accommodations (including auxiliary communicative aids and services) during this proceeding
should call the A.D.A. Clerk at 451-4409, at least three working days prior to the proceeding.

